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Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016)

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is the forty-second submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), paragraph 10 of resolution 2165 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2191 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2258 (2015) and paragraph 5 of resolution 2332 (2016), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolutions by all parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The information contained herein is based on data available to United Nations agencies and from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as from other Syrian and open sources. Data from United Nations agencies on their humanitarian deliveries have been reported for the period from 1 to 31 July 2017.

II. Major developments

Box 1
Key points in July 2017

(1) Several international initiatives carried out in July were focused on reducing violence and supporting a political solution for the Syrian Arab Republic, including the seventh round of formal intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, held from 10 to 14 July. A ceasefire initiative for an area including parts of Qunaytirah, Dar'a and Suwayda' Governorates in the south-western part of the country reportedly resulted in a significant drop in violence.

(2) In Raqqah city, heavy clashes, shelling and air strikes continued to result in significant civilian casualties and injuries. Between 20,000 and 50,000 people remain trapped in the city. The number of people displaced since 1 April across the north-eastern part of the country by the offensive continued to grow, surpassing 200,000.

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(3) An eruption of fighting between non-State armed opposition groups in Idlib Governorate resulted in civilian casualties. The Bab al-Hawa border crossing area, used for United Nations cross-border operations from Turkey, was temporarily closed for a week owing to the fighting; humanitarian partners' operations were also affected.

(4) On 30 July, a United Nations inter-agency cross-line operation was the first convoy ever to reach the besieged town of Nashabiyah, in eastern Ghutah. The convoy provided 7,200 people with assistance. Five other inter-agency convoys were dispatched in July, reaching some 190,500 people in hard-to-reach locations.

(5) The removal of medical supplies from humanitarian convoys remains a major challenge, with supplies sufficient for more than 66,884 treatments removed in July.

3. My Special Envoy for Syria convened the seventh round of formal intra-Syrian talks in Geneva from 10 to 14 July. The High Negotiations Committee, along with the Cairo and Moscow platforms, coalesced around common positions regarding the principles underpinning the talks and the schedule and process for the drafting of a new constitution. The Government also continued to discuss the aforementioned principles and to focus on counter-terrorism issues. During the intra-Syrian talks, my Special Envoy also met with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and sought its insights and inputs. Immediately following the seventh round of talks, between 17 and 27 July, the Office of the Special Envoy conducted a series of simultaneous regional consultations in Beirut; Gaziantep, Turkey; and Amman that involved more than 120 actors and networks from Syrian civil society. Those consultations were conducted to strengthen the inclusivity and continuity of the Civil Society Support Room as well as its impact on the Geneva political process.

4. Prior to the formal intra-Syrian talks, my Special Envoy, along with technical experts from his Office, attended the 4-5 July meeting of the Astana guarantors — Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Russian Federation and Turkey — of the 4 May 2017 memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas. During this round, the guarantors were not able to reach final agreement on the operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. There was some continued discussion on confidence-building measures on humanitarian demining and on the issue of detainees and missing persons.

5. The Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, following coordination with Jordan, announced a separate ceasefire agreement for the south-western area of the Syrian Arab Republic at the summit of the Group of 20 held in Hamburg, Germany, on 7 and 8 July. The ceasefire went into effect on 11 July, and since then the southern governorates of Dar'a, Qunaytirah and Suwayda' have witnessed a significant reduction in hostilities. In Dar'a city, only occasional ground-based strikes were reported after the ceasefire, with no air strikes reported in the city itself. Other areas controlled by non-State armed opposition groups in the governorate were hit by sporadic air strikes. Intermittent ground-based strikes and remote-controlled explosive devices also detonated on roadsides during the month, reportedly killing civilians.

Figure I
Key dates in July 2017


10 July
Seventh round of formal intra-Syrian talks commence
11 July
Ceasefire for Dar'a goes into effect
19-25 July
Bab al-Hawa border temporarily closed owing to fighting in Idlib
23 July
Launch of military operation on Syrian-Lebanese border
30 July
First ever inter-agency convoy to Nashabiyah

Box 2
Dayr al-Zawr

(1) The area of Dayr al-Zawr city under governmental control has been besieged by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since July 2014, which has deprived up to 93,500 people of regular access to food and medicine. During the reporting period, the situation of civilians in the besieged parts of Dayr al-Zawr city remained precarious. Clashes between Syrian government forces and ISIL and affiliated groups continued in various parts of the city, with high toll of civilian deaths and injuries reported.

(2) The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate throughout the month. Reports indicate that ISIL militants blocked the water supply to the besieged neighbourhoods during part of July. Civilians depend on untreated river water for regular consumption, which has reportedly led to illness. Civilians are also reported to be affected by highly inflated food prices, with limited food items available in the markets.

(3) Basic medical equipment is scarce, and medical treatment is limited to informal emergency care. During the last week of July, 150 new cases of kidney disease alone were registered in the hospital in Dayr al-Zawr city. The hospital, however, does not have sufficient medicine to care for all patients. Many civilians have been injured as a result of artillery and aerial shelling, yet trauma care is scarce. Meanwhile, ISIL continues to prevent even severely ill patients from seeking medical treatment in areas outside of its control.

(4) As the besieged areas of the city cannot be accessed by land owing to the ISIL presence, the World Food Programme (WFP) completed 287 airdrops between April 2016 and the end of July 2017, dispatching approximately 5,570 metric tons of WFP mixed food commodities and other humanitarian supplies, including nutritional items, medical kits and basic relief items, on behalf of other humanitarian actors. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent ensures the distribution of the airdropped assistance.

6. Rif Dimashq Governorate continued to witness high levels of violence in July. The earlier part of the month saw an escalation of conflict in eastern Ghutah. Clashes persisted in Duma and the surrounding areas, such as Hawsh al-Dawahira, as well as the south-eastern part of eastern Ghutah. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also received increased reports of strikes and ground combat around residential areas of Ayn Tarma, Hazzah, Zamalka and Irbin. A ceasefire covering the besieged area of eastern Ghutah, initiated by the Russian Federation and brokered in Cairo, was declared on 22 July. This led to an

overall decline in hostilities during the last week of the month, although air strikes and ground-based strikes continued in Ayn Tarma and the adjacent area of Jawbar in Damascus, as well as in Government-controlled parts of Damascus. In the western part of eastern Ghutah, government forces and their allies reportedly carried out near-daily ground-based strikes and air strikes on areas under the control of the armed opposition group Rahman Corps, which was not a party to the 22 July agreement.

7. July saw a major escalation in fighting in Idlib between the Jabhat Fath al-Sham-led Levant Liberation Organization and the non-State armed opposition group Ahrar al-Sham. Although no air strikes were reported in July, civilian casualties were reported, owing to the significant increase in clashes between Ahrar al-Sham and the Levant Liberation Organization. Those clashes ended with the Levant Liberation Organization emerging as the dominant force in Idlib after seizing positions from Ahrar al-Sham along the Turkish border, including the Bab al-Hawa crossing, used by the United Nations and its partners to deliver humanitarian assistance. The border area was closed from 19 to 25 July; additionally, some humanitarian activities within the governorate were also affected by insecurity. After the Levant Liberation Organization had withdrawn from Bab al-Hawa and handed it back to the local civilian administration, the crossing reopened for humanitarian shipments.

8. Elsewhere in Idlib Governorate, the situation in the besieged towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya remained precarious. Following a period of four months since the last inter-agency convoy to the towns, food stocks in Fu'ah and Kafraya are nearly depleted. The prices of available basic food items are several times higher than in the rest of the governorate. Non-State armed opposition groups and Jabhat Fath al-Sham have surrounded the besieged villages of Fu'ah and Kafraya since April 2015, imposing strict restrictions on humanitarian access, commercial traffic and freedom of movement.

9. The situation in Aleppo Governorate remained relatively calm during July. Aleppo city, which remains within the range of non-State armed opposition groups, was hit by sporadic ground-based fire. Non-State armed opposition groups clashed with the Kurdish People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or YPG) around Jarabulus city in eastern rural Aleppo in early July. There were also reports of ground-based shelling between YPG and forces on the Turkish side of the border.

10. Multiple national and international actors remained involved in the conduct of military operations against ISIL in Raqqah Governorate, with an escalation of air strikes and ground-based strikes on Raqqah city and elsewhere in the governorate. From 1 April through the end of July, more than 200,000 people were displaced owing to these operations. The Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by the United States-led international counter-ISIL coalition and led by YPG, surrounded the city of Raqqah and, on 6 July, broke through the old city walls. By the end of July, the Syrian Democratic Forces reportedly controlled more than half of the city.

11. The humanitarian situation inside Raqqah city remains dire, with the population (numbering between 20,000 and 50,000) reportedly facing deteriorating humanitarian, health, living and security conditions. Civilian movement in and out of the city is undertaken at great personal risk as a result of the presence of mines, as well as shelling, sniper activities and air strikes. Those who flee face a number of protection risks, including punitive measures put in place by ISIL, threats posed by mine contamination, family separation, and forced recruitment at checkpoints, as well as the confiscation of identification documents and restricted movement upon entering displacement camps.

12. The United States Department of Defense publicly confirmed that in July the United States-led coalition had conducted 194 strikes against ISIL targets in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate — 70 in and around ISIL-controlled Albu Kamal city and 124 in Dayr al-Zawr city. The situation in Dayr al-Zawr city remained extremely difficult, as outlined in box 2. Meanwhile, government forces and their allies advanced through the desert area near the Iraqi border towards Albu Kamal city.

13. OHCHR documented frequent air strikes and ground-based strikes on ISIL-controlled areas in the southern part of Hasakah Governorate in July, some of which reportedly led to civilian casualties. ISIL fighters also carried out periodic ground-based strikes on surrounding Kurdish-controlled areas. The United States Department of Defense publicly confirmed that, in July, the United States-led coalition had conducted 45 strikes against ISIL targets in the governorate, nearly all of them in Shaddadah.

14. Despite efforts of the United Nations and its partners at all levels, the situation of internally displaced persons in the Kurdish Self-Administration-run Hawl and Mabruk camps, in Hasakah Governorate, remains dire and is exacerbated by the high summer temperatures. The management procedures and administrative requirements of the Kurdish Self-Administration with regard to internally displaced persons pose significant additional challenges to the internally displaced, including the confiscation of identification documents and the restriction of movement. Furthermore, access restrictions on humanitarian operations (of the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations and national non-governmental organizations) applied by the Kurdish Self-Administration in the north-eastern part of the Syrian Arab Republic limit the humanitarian response. Those restrictions include bureaucratic impediments and the suspension of regular programme activities in Hasakah in an effort to direct aid to specific areas.

15. The government offensive aimed at retaking ISIL-held areas in rural eastern Hama continued in July, with air strikes and ground-based strikes in support of ground forces in and around the ISIL-held area of Uqayribat. On 5 July, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation indicated that long-range strategic bombers had launched cruise missiles at ISIL warehouses of weapons and ammunition as well as at a command post on the border of Hama and Homs Governorates. The Ministry also publicly stated on 24 July that some 20,000 square kilometres had been "liberated" over the previous two months and that Russian aerospace forces had conducted 2,010 combat flights for that purpose, with 5,850 air attacks carried out against command posts, weapons and ammunition warehouses, and bases and training camps. It added that the most important ISIL facilities had been hit with sea-launched cruise missiles and air-launched missiles, and concluded that any efforts by terrorists and their supporters to disrupt reconciliation would be suppressed and operations aimed at liberating territory of the Syrian Arab Republic from ISIL and the Levant Liberation Organization would continue.

16. The United States Department of Defense publicly confirmed that in July, the United States-led international counter-ISIL coalition had carried out 885 strikes against ISIL targets in the governorates of Dayr al-Zawr, Hasakah, Homs and Raqqah. Of those strikes, 645 were reported to have been in Raqqah city and, as stated above, 194 in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate.

17. On 23 July, a joint operation was launched by Hizbullah and the Syrian army along the Syrian-Lebanese border. On 26 July, a local agreement between Hizbullah and the Levant Liberation Organization was reached in order to evacuate fighters and civilians from nearby refugee camps to Idlib. By the end of the reporting period, some 5,288 people had reached parts of Idlib and Aleppo Governorates. The United Nations was neither part of the negotiations nor part of the implementation of the

agreement. The new influx adds to the already precarious situation in Idlib, where 1 million internally displaced persons are living, many forced to relocate from formerly besieged areas in the Syrian Arab Republic as a result of previous such agreements. Humanitarian partners continue to provide multisectoral assistance to those in need in Idlib.

18. Along the Syrian-Jordanian border, at the area known as the berm, approximately 50,000 people remain in a precarious protection, security and humanitarian situation. The establishment of a corridor controlled by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic north of the berm has reportedly resulted in restrictions on the movement of both people and goods to the berm from within the Syrian Arab Republic. As the Government consolidates its control in the east, military action has intensified, heightening levels of insecurity. United Nations agencies have expressed concerns regarding the safety and security of the civilian population in the settlements of Hadalat and Rukban at the berm. The last cycle of distribution of humanitarian assistance was halted on 15 June. The United Nations has urgently sought a resumption of the distribution of aid and the authorization to register the population as a means of further facilitating the delivery of assistance.

19. In a note verbale dated 2 August, the Permanent Mission of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic provided OHCHR with a table of figures concerning alleged civilian casualties in the governorates of Aleppo, Damascus, Dar'a, Dayr al-Zawr, Hama, Hasakah, Homs, Idlib, Ladhiqiyah, Rif Dimashq, Suwayda' and Qunaytirah resulting from the firing of mortars and the use of improvised explosive devices by various "terrorist" armed groups for the period from 22 June to 21 July. The note indicated that 81 civilians had reportedly been killed, among them 15 children, and 489 civilians reportedly injured, including 89 children.

20. OHCHR received reports of the use of toxic agents in several instances, including on 1 and 14 July in Zamalka and Ayn Tarma, eastern Ghutah, Rif Dimashq Governorate, although the Office was unable to independently corroborate those allegations.

Protection

21. The United Nations and health partners received credible reports of eight attacks that had affected health-care facilities and personnel in July, of which two have been verified and six are currently being verified. One verified incident affected a hospital in Kafr Nubl city, Idlib Governorate, which sustained minor damage owing to an attack with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device near the hospital. No casualties were reported. A second verified incident occurred during a vaccination campaign in the town of Mayadin, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. A vehicle operated by medical personnel administering the vaccinations was hit by an air strike and was destroyed.

22. In July, the United Nations verified the following attacks occurring in June: on 15 June in the afternoon, an empty school in Sousa, Albu Kamal, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, allegedly used by ISIL, was targeted by four rockets, resulting in damage to its walls; and on 27 June, more than 40 rockets reportedly impacted the Kashif neighbourhood of Dar'a city, causing extensive damage to the building of a nearby kindergarten. The number of casualties among children and educational personnel is not yet known.

Humanitarian access

Box 3
Key points for humanitarian access

(1) Some 13.5 million people in the Syrian Arab Republic remain in need of humanitarian assistance, including 6.3 million internally displaced persons. An estimated 3.9 million people live in hard-to-reach areas, and another 540,000 people are currently besieged in 11 areas. Seven areas are besieged by the Government (80 per cent of the total besieged population), one by both the Government and non-State armed opposition groups (1 per cent of the total besieged population), two by non-State armed opposition groups (2 per cent of the total besieged population) and one by ISIL (17 per cent of the total besieged population).

(2) On 30 July, with a convoy to Nashabiyah, eastern Ghutah, reaching 7,200 people, one besieged area was reached through United Nations inter-agency cross-line operations during the reporting period, beyond Dayr al-Zawr (reached through airdrops; see box 2, para. 4). Five more inter-agency convoys were dispatched during the reporting period, reaching some 190,500 people in the following hard-to-reach locations: (a) Yalda, Babila, Bayt Saham and Tadamun; (b) Hulah; (c) Harbinafsih; (d) Dar al-Kabirah, Ghantu and Tayr Ma'lah; and (e) Dayr Khabiyah and Zakiyah. This brings the total number of people reached under the June-July plan to 400,000, or 37 per cent of the overall number of people to whom access was originally requested under the plan. Moreover, on 27 July a Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy delivered United Nations and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) medical and nutritional items for 35,000 people in need in besieged eastern Ghutah in Rif Dimashq Governorate through Duma city, with a second batch of supplies planned to be delivered in the near future. The removal of medical supplies from the convoys remains a major challenge, with supplies sufficient for more than 66,884 treatments removed in July.

(3) Owing to security concerns on the Syrian side of the border, Turkish authorities temporarily closed the Bab al-Hawa crossing point to commercial traffic from 19 to 25 July. New cross-border regulations have been set up by the Turkish border administration to restrict goods that can be shipped commercially. However, the United Nations has been informed that these new regulations would not affect United Nations humanitarian shipments. During the reporting period, approximately 700,000 people were provided food assistance by the United Nations and partners through cross-border operations from Turkey and Jordan.

(4) Land deliveries to the north-eastern governorates through the Aleppo-Manbij route proceeded in a regular manner throughout the reporting period. In July, through those deliveries, the United Nations provided food assistance to 193,950 people in Hasakah Governorate, to 165,500 people in Raqqah Governorate and to 15,000 people in north-western Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. The United Nations also reached Mansurah, in Rif Dimashq Governorate, and Thawrah city (Tabaqah) and rural areas north of Raqqah city, in Raqqah Governorate, for the first time in three years, delivering food for some 30,000 people.

(5) Since late 2016, approximately 290,000 people have returned to the formerly besieged areas of Aleppo city; they are now receiving monthly United Nations food rations as well as fresh bread on a daily basis. In addition, the United Nations provided 56.7 metric tons of fortified wheat flour to the hard-to-reach neighbourhood of Shaykh Maqsud, enabling daily bread distributions for 18,900 people.

23. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need remained extremely challenging in many areas of the country as a result of active conflict, shifting conflict lines, administrative impediments and deliberate restrictions imposed on the movement of people and goods by the parties to the conflict. In particular, access for the United Nations and its partners to those living in besieged and hard-to-reach locations remained a critical concern. The United Nations inter-agency convoy plan for June and July requested access to 27 locations, including besieged areas, seeking to reach 1,081,900 people. In July, however, only six inter-agency convoys could be dispatched to besieged and hard-to-reach locations, reaching only 197,700 of the 227,250 people in need in those areas (see table 3 for a list of inter-agency convoys sent in July). In addition, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy delivered United Nations and ICRC medical and nutritional items for people in need in besieged eastern Ghutah, in Rif Dimashq Governorate, through Duma city, reaching 35,000 people. The total number of people reached under the June-July plan is 400,000, or 37 per cent of the overall number of people to whom access was originally requested under the plan. That number does not include convoys carrying supplies delivered by other humanitarian actors.

24. Individual agencies continued to submit requests for single-agency deliveries during the reporting period to locations across the country. WFP submitted 1,741 official requests to obtain facilitation letters for the transport of food assistance to targeted locations across the country, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees submitted 44 facilitation letters for the movement of core relief items and livelihood kits, the large majority of which were approved. Moreover, both international and Syrian non-governmental organizations continued to undertake needs assessments and provide support (including medical, educational, psychosocial and protection services) in besieged and hard-to-reach locations, under extremely challenging circumstances and in accordance with humanitarian principles.

Figure II

United Nations inter-agency cross-line humanitarian operations: percentage of people reached each month in besieged areas, including through airdrops to Dayr al-Zawr city



25. The majority of United Nations agencies and partners continue to be unable to gain access to populations in need in areas of the country controlled by ISIL, as all plans to deliver assistance to those areas have been suspended as a result of continued security concerns. This has prevented the United Nations and its humanitarian partners from reaching Raqqah city and most of Dayr al-Zawr

Governorate, as well as pockets of northern rural Aleppo and north-western rural Hama.

26. Land deliveries to the north-eastern governorates through the Aleppo-Manbij route proceeded in a regular manner in July. Through those deliveries, the United Nations provided food assistance to 193,950 people in Hasakah Governorate, to 165,500 people in Raqqah Governorate and to 15,000 people in north-western Dayr al-Zawr Governorate. Furthermore, starting in July, fortified wheat flour was added to the food rations provided in the north-eastern governorates. Wheat flour had not been included previously owing to the limited cargo capacity of the airlifts. Since the resumption of land deliveries in June, a total of 105 trucks have arrived at the WFP warehouse in Qamishli, enabling the United Nations to provide assistance to 374,450 people in hard-to-reach areas of Hasakah, Raqqah and Dayr al-Zawr Governorates.

Figure III
United Nations inter-agency cross-line humanitarian operations by land, July 2017

27. Life-saving and life-sustaining medical items sufficient for more than 66,884 treatments were removed from convoys in July by the Syrian authorities. Details regarding the treatments and supplies removed are shown in table 1. Additional medical supplies were scheduled to be delivered as part of the bimonthly inter-agency convoy plan, but only five inter-agency convoys were able to proceed during the June-July cycle. Furthermore, since the beginning of 2017 the World Health Organization (WHO) has submitted 10 single-agency requests to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to gain access to 14 locations in six governorates. The Government has approved five requests, four remain unanswered and one has been rejected.

Table 1
Medical supplies removed from humanitarian convoys in July 2017

Location	*No. of treatments*	*Types of supplies*
Yalda, Babila, Bayt Saham and Tadamun	1 160	Oxygen concentrators, sterilizers, X-ray devices, surgical cautery device for operating rooms, adult ventilators, ultrasound systems and medicines including analgesics, pneumonia kits, anti-hypertensives and anti-epileptic medication
Hulah and Harbinafsih	10 751	Minor surgery instruments, ultrasound systems, electrocardiograph instruments and medicines including antihypertensives, anti-epileptic medication, carbamazepine, pneumonia kits, anti-asthma medication, salbutamol, beclomethasone dipropionate and inter-agency emergency health kits 2011. The number of midwifery kits was reduced from 8 to 2 by the Ministry of Health in the approval letter, and quantities of povidone-iodine solution were also reduced. Resuscitation kits were not approved for loading.
Dayr Khabiyah and Zakiyah	1 230	Reduced quantity of anti-asthma medicine
Dar al-Kabirah, Ghantu and Tayr Ma'lah	6 789	Minor-surgery instruments, ultrasound systems, electrocardiograph instruments, medicines including antihypertensives, anti-epileptic medication, carbamazepine, pneumonia kits, anti-asthma medication, salbutamol, beclomethasone dipropionate and inter-agency emergency health kits 2011. The number of midwifery kits was reduced from 2 to 1. Resuscitation kits were not approved for loading.
Duma	46 954	Medical equipment, including defibrillators, adult ventilators, ultrasound systems, portable X-ray machines, autoclave, flame photometer and incubators

Humanitarian response

28. In July, United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners continued to reach millions of people in need through all available modalities, including from within the Syrian Arab Republic, in collaboration with the Syrian authorities, and across its borders (see table 2). In addition to the United Nations and partners, non-governmental organizations continued to deliver life-saving assistance to people in need. The Government continued to provide basic services both in areas under its control and in many beyond its control. Local authorities in many areas controlled by non-State armed opposition groups also continued to provide services when possible.

Table 2
Number of people reached by the United Nations and other organizations, July 2017

Organization	*Number of people reached*
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	73 230
International Organization for Migration	45 000
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	130 740
United Nations Children's Fund	>2 100 000

Organization	*Number of people reached*
United Nations Development Programme	125 396
United Nations Population Fund	250 000
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	>250 000
World Food Programme	>4 200 0000
World Health Organization	860 371

29. During the reporting period, cross-border deliveries continued from Turkey and Jordan into the Syrian Arab Republic under the terms of Security Council resolutions 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015) and 2332 (2016) (see figure IV for details). In line with those resolutions, the United Nations notified the Syrian authorities in advance of each shipment, including its content, destination and number of beneficiaries. The United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic continued its operations, monitoring 391 trucks used in 17 convoys by six United Nations entities in July, confirming the humanitarian nature of each and notifying the Syrian authorities after each shipment. The Mechanism continued to benefit from the excellent cooperation of the Governments of Jordan and Turkey.

Figure IV

Number of beneficiaries assisted by the United Nations and its partners per cluster through cross-border humanitarian deliveries, July 2017

(Thousands)



30. In July, WFP carried out 22 high-altitude airdrop rotations to Dayr al-Zawr city, airdropping food rations sufficient for 50,445 people as well as supplies from other humanitarian actors. Since the start of airdrop rotations in April 2016, the United Nations has completed 287 rotations, dispatching more than 5,570 metric tons of food assistance and supplies to those in need in Dayr al-Zawr city.

Table 3
Inter-agency cross-line humanitarian convoys, July 2017

Date	*Location*	*Requested target (number of beneficiaries)*	*Number of beneficiaries reached*	*Type of assistance*
7 July	Yalda, Babila, Bayt Saham and Tadamun	51 000	35 000	Multisectoral
15 July	Hulah	89 000	89 000	Multisectoral
15 July	Harbinafsih			Multisectoral
22 July	Dar al-Kabirah, Ghantu and Tayr Ma'lah	37 750	33 500	Multisectoral
29 July	Dayr Khabiyah and Zakiyah	33 000	33 000	Multisectoral
30 July	Nashabiyah	16 500	7 200	Multisectoral

31. During the reporting period, WHO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and their implementing partners delivered more than 860,000 medical treatments in 10 governorates, including nearly 480,000 treatments across borders and 245,000 treatments across conflict lines. WHO and UNICEF also supported 150,000 consultations and distributed 46 pieces of medical equipment to various hospitals and clinics. Moreover, a polio vaccination campaign was conducted in Dayr al-Zawr Governorate from 22 to 26 July, reaching a total of 259,958 children (aged 0-59 months), or 79 per cent of the total target.

32. On 23 July, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) started the third round of cash assistance for 2017, benefiting up to 418,000 Palestine refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic. Moreover, the first round of food distributions was carried out from 19 February to 30 July, with more than 367,000 Palestine refugees receiving food parcels.

33. Throughout July, the Russian Federation sent to the United Nations information bulletins from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, which outlined the provision of bilateral relief assistance. Other Member States also continued to provide bilateral and other forms of humanitarian assistance.

Visas and registrations

34. A total of 81 new United Nations visa requests were submitted to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in July. Of these, 33 were approved, 2 were denied and 46 remain pending. Of the new visa applications submitted in earlier months, a further 19 were approved in July and 18 remain pending. A total of 60 United Nations visa renewal requests were submitted in July, of which 53 were approved and 7 remain pending. A further 16 visa renewals submitted in earlier months were also approved, while 3 remain pending.

35. A total of 22 international non-governmental organizations are registered with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to operate in the country. Four international non-governmental organizations are in the process of completing their registrations. Those organizations continued to face a series of administrative hurdles and restrictions that affected their ability to operate, including in gaining permission to undertake independent needs assessments. The Syrian authorities have, however, initiated dialogue with the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations to streamline and simplify registration and operational procedures for international non-governmental organizations. Moreover,

some 217 national non-governmental organizations are authorized by the Syrian Arab Republic to partner with the United Nations.

Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and premises

36. Since the start of the conflict, dozens of humanitarian workers have been killed, including 21 staff members of the United Nations, of whom 17 were UNRWA staff members, 65 were staff members and volunteers of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, and 8 were staff members and volunteers of the Palestine Red Crescent Society. In addition, many staff members of international and national non-governmental organizations are reported to have been killed.

37. A total of 28 United Nations staff members, including 1 UNDP staff member and 27 UNRWA staff members, are detained or missing.

III. Observations

38. As demonstrated by concurrent developments in Astana, Amman and Cairo during the reporting period, there remain persistent and determined efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements. I welcome those efforts, and I hope that the Astana guarantors will soon reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas, particularly Idlib, as well as for the promotion of confidence-building measures regarding the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons and humanitarian demining.

39. I urge all parties to work together to consolidate and expand these ceasefires. I wish to stress that any reduction in hostilities must also generate concrete results for safe, unimpeded and sustained freedom of movement and humanitarian access. Access to areas identified for de-escalation, and to many other areas across the Syrian Arab Republic where needs are great, remains far short of what is required. Millions of civilians remain without critical life-saving assistance. In particular, in areas where there has been a decrease in fighting, there is no excuse for any side to restrict access.

40. Furthermore, while acknowledging that de-escalation areas can contribute to the reduction of violence, I urge all countries to preserve the right of all Syrians to seek asylum and enjoy refugee protection until conditions are conducive to return in safety and in dignity. I wish to reiterate that any evacuation of civilians must be safe, voluntary and to a place of their choosing. Additionally, de-escalation areas are, and must remain, interim in nature. The United Nations stands ready to provide technical support and expertise to assist with interim arrangements for de-escalation, as they have the potential to produce the stability required to support an inclusive political process guided by resolution 2254 (2015).

41. Air and ground-based strikes continue to kill, injure and displace civilians in significant numbers. As ISIL continues to lose ground, concerns about the civilian population remaining under its control increase, while at the same time those who are able to flee the fighting face difficult and worsening conditions in camps. I reiterate my call that all those conducting military operations in the Syrian Arab Republic must do so in compliance with international humanitarian law, in particular as it relates to the protection of civilians, who have already lost so much in this terrible conflict, and to civilian infrastructure.

42. I remain deeply troubled by the ongoing allegations of serious violations and abuses of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law that are having a grave impact on the lives of civilians across the country. I call on all parties to end indiscriminate attacks. I call again for the

situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to be referred to the International Criminal Court. I also call on the Syrian Arab Republic to grant access to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, I call on all Member States, all parties to the conflict, civil society and the United Nations system as a whole to cooperate fully with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

43. Ultimately, the political process is the only course that can provide a lasting solution to the Syrian conflict and bring an end to the tremendous suffering of the Syrian people. I am encouraged that the seventh round of formal intra-Syrian talks in Geneva generated incremental and positive progress. I strongly concur with my Special Envoy on the need to emphasize the importance of continuing to engage with civil society to support the inclusive mediation approach of the United Nations. In support of my Special Envoy, I welcome the constructive engagement by the High Negotiations Committee and the Cairo and Moscow platforms during the seventh round of talks in Geneva, and I urge them to continue to consolidate common positions. I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to constructively formulate concrete thinking with regard to the four baskets, namely, governance issues, constitutional issues, electoral issues, and issues related to counter-terrorism, security and confidence-building measures, particularly the schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, so that substantive and direct political negotiations can occur during the forthcoming eighth round of intra-Syrian talks.

44. While the political process continues, those affected by the conflict continue to suffer. With 13.5 million people living in the Syrian Arab Republic and another 5 million having fled their country, the needs are staggering. The United Nations will continue to focus on meeting their needs, providing life-saving assistance and advocating their protection, but meaningful progress will require that all parties respect their obligations under international humanitarian and international human rights law.

Annex

Incidents affecting civilians recorded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, July 2017*

Rif Dimashq and Damascus Governorates

- On 1 July, an aid worker was reportedly killed by a strike in Zamalka while providing humanitarian support to those wounded.
- On 2 July, a car bomb detonated in the Bab Tuma neighbourhood of Damascus, allegedly causing the deaths of at least six civilians and wounding an unknown number.
- On 2 July, ground-based strikes hit residential areas in the vicinity of a mosque in opposition-controlled Duma, reportedly resulting in the death of a male civilian.
- On 3 July, a male civilian was allegedly killed by a sniper in the residential area of Khams in Zamalka.
- On 3 July, ground-based strikes hit a residential area in Duma, reportedly killing two male civilians.
- On 4 July at approximately 8.30 a.m., air strikes hit a residential area of Duma and allegedly killed two civilians — a woman and a child — and injured at least five others, including two children.
- On 5 July, ground-based strikes hit residential areas in Duma and reportedly killed a male civilian.
- On 10 July at approximately 12 p.m., ground-based strikes hit a market in Kafr Batna and allegedly resulted in the death of two male civilians and the injury of an unknown number of others, including children.
- On 12 July at approximately 9.30 a.m., ground-based strikes hit a residential area of Duma and reportedly killed two civilians, including a woman and a 7-month-old girl.
- On 13 July in the morning, air strikes hit residential areas of Hazzah and Ayn Tarma and allegedly killed two civilians — one of them a woman — in Hazzah and two civilians in Ayn Tarma.
- On 13 July, air strikes hit a residential area of Hazzah, reportedly resulting in the deaths of two male civilians.
- On 14 July, eight successive air strikes hit a residential area in Ayn Tarma, impacting a residential building that collapsed and allegedly killing at least 14 civilians, including 5 women, 2 boys and a girl, and wounding more than 30 others. Among the 14 reportedly killed was a family of three — both parents and their daughter. A woman injured during the incident died on 17 July.

* In line with resolution 2258 (2015), the present description of developments on the ground, and the incidents during the month that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has been able to corroborate, relates to compliance with resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic. The information is provided without prejudice to the work of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group. The reporting is not a comprehensive listing of all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of international human rights law that took place in the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period.

- On 14 July in the morning, air strikes hit a residential area in Zamalka and reportedly killed one male civilian.
- On 14 July, air strikes hit a nearby residential area in Hazzah and allegedly caused the death of a male civilian and the injury of several others.
- On 16 July at approximately 11.30 a.m., two successive air strikes hit the main road between Hazzah and Zamalka, impacting a residential area in Hazzah and reportedly killing a boy and a girl.
- On 17 July, a civilian woman was allegedly killed when air strikes hit residential areas of Duma.
- On 17 July, air strikes hit a building in a residential area of Jawbar, reportedly resulting in the death of two civilians — a wife and her husband.
- On July 24 at approximately 11.30 p.m., seven air strikes hit residential areas of Irbin and allegedly killed at least seven civilians, including a woman and three girls, in addition to causing numerous casualties, including among children.

Dar'a Governorate

- On 1 July at approximately 12.40 p.m., air strikes hit the town of Muzayrib, reportedly resulting in the death of three civilians — two children and an internally displaced man.
- On 1 July, ground-based strikes hit a residential area in the opposition-controlled town of Da'il, allegedly killing a civilian woman.
- On 1 July, ground-based strikes hit the Government-controlled neighbourhood of Kashif in Dar'a city, reportedly causing the death of a married civilian couple.
- On 2 July at approximately 1 a.m., ground-based strikes hit residential areas on the western side of opposition-controlled Sanamayn, allegedly causing the death of a civilian.
- On 2 July at approximately 2 p.m., ground-based strikes hit opposition-controlled Tafas city, allegedly killing one male civilian.
- On 3 July, ground-based strikes hit the opposition-controlled town of Izra', reportedly killing one civilian woman and wounding several other civilians.
- On 5 July, ground-based strikes hit a residential area in the Government-controlled neighbourhood of Dar'a al-Mahattah in Dar'a city, allegedly killing one child.
- On 6 July, ground-based strikes hit the opposition-controlled neighbourhood of Mukhayyam Dar'a, reportedly resulting in the death of a displaced girl from Qunaytirah.
- On 7 July, air strikes hit the opposition-controlled village of Ayb, allegedly killing a displaced child and injuring an unknown number of other civilians.
- Between 9 and 12 July, Jaish Khalid ibn al-Walid fighters in Shajarah reportedly killed a 21-year-old civilian man from Tasil and a 52-year-old civilian man from Saham al-Jawlan, accusing them of "blasphemy." Both men were held for several days by the group's "Hisbah" religious police force before being killed.

Aleppo Governorate

- On 10 July, an 18-year-old female civilian was allegedly shot and killed by a sniper in the village of Tuways, south of the town of Mare' in northern rural Aleppo.
- On 8 July, a 6-year-old girl was reportedly killed when she was shot in the head near the Basil roundabout area of the Furqan neighbourhood of western Aleppo city.
- On 10 July, ground-based strikes hit Masjid Ar-Rahman Street in the New Aleppo neighbourhood of western Aleppo city, allegedly killing at least five civilians and injuring nine others.

Idlib Governorate

- On 4 July, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device exploded next to a secondary school in Qunaytirah, in western rural Idlib, reportedly killing three male teachers and four boys.
- On 12 July, ground-based strikes hit rural areas in the vicinity of Jisr al-Shughur city, allegedly injuring four civilians, including a woman and a child.
- On 14 July, two ground-based strikes hit the villages of Safyan and Bdama, on the western side of Jisr al-Shughur, and reportedly killed one male civilian.
- On 19 July, more than 1,500 residents of Saraqib reportedly took part in a protest demanding the cessation of fighting between the Levant Liberation Organization and Ahrar al-Sham and the departure of Levant Liberation Organization fighters from the city. When demonstrators reached the vicinity of the court, around 15 Levant Liberation Organization fighters in a pickup truck reportedly fired in the air to disperse protesters before opening fire on the crowd, allegedly killing one journalist and severely injuring two civilians.

Hama Governorate

- On 2 July, air strikes hit the village of Rasm al-Awabid, 5 km south of Uqayribat, and reportedly killed two boys, one 16 years of age and the other 17.
- On 21 July at approximately 7 p.m., four ground-based strikes hit the western part of Salamiyah city, allegedly killing 6 civilians, including 3 women, and injuring at least 30 civilians, including women and children. Two civilians reportedly died on 22 July as a result of their injuries.

Dayr al-Zawr Governorate

- On 8 July, at least 5 civilians, 3 of them children, were reportedly killed and 14 others injured when air strikes hit a residential area of ISIL-controlled Mayadin city in the eastern rural area of the governorate.
- On 8 July, ground-based strikes hit the Government-controlled Harabish neighbourhood of Dayr al-Zawr city, allegedly striking close to civilian houses and killing two children under the age of 9. In its public reporting, the United States-led coalition stated that on that day four strikes had been carried out near Dayr al-Zawr, destroying 11 ISIL oil stills, 3 oil-still tanks, 3 oil tankers, an oil separator tank, a wellhead and a pump jack.
- On 10 July, air strikes hit residential areas of Mayadin city and reportedly killed 7 civilians and injured 19 others.

- On 11 July, three children and their mother were allegedly killed when ground-based strikes hit a residential area in the Harabish neighbourhood of Dayr al-Zawr city. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had carried out six strikes on or near Dayr al-Zawr, engaging an ISIL tactical unit and destroying 25 ISIL oil refinement stills, 5 oil tanks and 10 oil tankers.

- On 11 July, air strikes hit residential areas in ISIL-controlled Albu Kamal city on the eastern side of the governorate and reportedly killed at least 8 civilians, including 3 women and 1 child, and injured at least 27 others, including women and children. The air strikes also reportedly destroyed four civilian houses and several shops in the area. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had conducted five strikes near Albu Kamal, destroying 19 ISIL oil refinement stills, 4 weapons caches, 4 wellheads, 3 separator tanks and a storage tank.

- On 12 July, three civilians were allegedly killed and two others were injured when ground-based strikes hit a residential area in the Government-controlled Qusur neighbourhood of Dayr al-Zawr city. In its public reporting, the United States-led coalition stated that on that day it had carried out six strikes near Dayr al-Zawr and destroyed 16 ISIL oil stills, 10 oil barrels, 6 oil trucks and 2 wellheads.

- On 15 July, air strikes hit residential areas of Mayadin city near Khawlah bint al-Azwar School and reportedly killed at least five civilians, including two children. The school was not damaged, but the houses in its vicinity were.

- On 16 July, air strikes hit residential areas in the Mayadin area in the eastern rural part of the governorate, allegedly killing no fewer than 11 civilians, including 4 children, and injuring at least 4 other civilians.

- On 19 July, air strikes hit residential areas in the town of Ayyash and reportedly killed 15 civilians, including 4 women and 2 children, and injured 18 other civilians.

- On 24 July, air strikes hit residential areas at the end of Arba'in Street in Mayadin city and allegedly killed at least five civilians and injured several others.

- On 26 July, air strikes hit three areas in Albu Kamal city, including Thawrah School, where ISIL fighters are known to gather; the outskirts of the city; and a civilian house behind the Khalij gallery. At least nine civilians were reportedly killed, including one woman and two children.

- On 28 July, air strikes hit a civilian house and allegedly killed at least nine civilians, including a mother and her three children, in the village of Taybah, in eastern rural Dayr al-Zawr.

Raqqah Governorate

- On 2 July, air strikes hit a residential area close to the Jami' al-Atiq (Old Mosque) neighbourhood of Raqqah city and reportedly killed five civilians from a single family, including three children, and injured at least two other civilians. On the same day, air strikes hit residential areas of the Dariyah neighbourhood in the western part of the city, allegedly killing five civilians — two women and three children. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had conducted 14 strikes near Raqqah, engaged 13 ISIL tactical units and destroyed 10 fighting positions and a mortar system.

- On 4 July, a family of seven civilians were reportedly killed when air strikes hit a residential area of Raqqah city. In its public reporting, the United States-led coalition stated that on that day it had conducted 27 strikes near Raqqah, engaged 19 ISIL tactical units and destroyed 17 fighting positions, three tactical vehicles, another vehicle, two heavy machine guns, a mortar system, a weapons cache, a command-and-control node, a vehicle-borne-bomb facility and a vehicle-borne bomb.

- On 6 July, air strikes hit residential areas of Raqqah city and allegedly killed at least 4 civilians and injured at least 17 others. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had conducted nine strikes near Raqqah, engaged nine ISIL tactical units and destroyed seven fighting positions, an ISIL headquarters and a vehicle bomb.

- On 9 July, air strikes hit residential areas in Raqqah city and reportedly killed six civilians, including one woman and two children, and injured four other civilians. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had conducted 11 strikes near Raqqah, engaging nine ISIL tactical units and destroying seven fighting positions, a weapons cache, a supply cache, an anti-air-artillery system, a tunnel and an ISIL communications tower.

- On 13 July, seven civilians, including three children and a woman, were allegedly killed when air strikes hit residential areas of Raqqah city. In its public reporting, the United States-led coalition stated that on that day it had carried out nine strikes near Raqqah, engaged five ISIL tactical units, destroyed three ISIL communications towers, three fighting positions, a command-and-control node, a front-end loader and an artillery system, and damaged three supply routes.

- On 15 July, three civilians, including a woman and a child, were reportedly killed when unexploded ordnance exploded in the village of Akarshah, in the southern rural area of the governorate. The village was under the control of ISIL during the first half of July.

- On 16 July, air strikes hit residential areas of Raqqah city and allegedly killed 13 civilians, including 4 children and 2 women. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had conducted 15 strikes near Raqqah, engaging 13 ISIL tactical units and destroying 18 fighting positions, two vehicle bomb factories and a mortar system.

- On 17 July, air strikes hit residential areas of Raqqah city, reportedly killing 23 civilians, including at least 3 women and 6 children, and injuring 24 others. In its public reporting, the United States-led coalition stated that on that day it had conducted 16 strikes near Raqqah, engaging 10 ISIL tactical units and destroying 13 fighting positions, two ISIL-held buildings, a tactical vehicle and an unmanned aerial system.

- On 18 July, 7 civilians were allegedly killed and a further 12 injured when air strikes hit residential areas of Raqqah city. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had carried out 12 strikes near Raqqah and engaged 11 ISIL tactical units as well as destroying nine fighting positions, two vehicles and a tactical vehicle.

- On 19 July, air strikes reportedly hit residential areas of the ISIL-controlled village of Zawr Shammar, in the eastern rural part of the governorate, killing 11 civilians.

- On 19 July, eight civilians were allegedly killed when air strikes hit residential areas of ISIL-controlled Nazlat Shahadah.

- On 22 July, air strikes hit residential areas in the Dariyah neighbourhood of Raqqah city and reportedly killed six civilians, including a 6-year-old boy and a 7-year-old girl. The United States-led coalition publicly reported that on that day it had conducted nine strikes near Raqqah and engaged seven ISIL tactical units, destroyed eight fighting positions and a mortar system, and damaged two supply routes.
- On 23 July, air strikes hit residential areas of the ISIL-controlled village of Zawr Shammar and Ma'dan city and allegedly killed 4 civilians in Zawr Shammar and 2 in Ma'dan, with a further 19 injured in both areas. Zawr Shammar is now within the range of fire of the advancing government forces.
- On 28 July, at least 15 civilians, including 2 women and 8 children, were reportedly killed when air strikes hit their home in the centre of Raqqah city. Among those killed were a mother and her five children. At least three other civilians were also reportedly injured. In its public reporting, the United States-led coalition stated that on that day it had carried out 12 strikes near Raqqah, engaging 10 ISIL tactical units, destroying eight fighting positions, an artillery system and a vehicle, and suppressing a fighting position.

Hasakah Governorate

- On 3 July, air strikes hit residential areas of the ISIL-controlled village of Ziyanat, south of the town of Shaddadah, in the southern rural area of the governorate, and reportedly killed eight civilians from two families, including one woman and six children.
- On 4 July, air strikes hit a residential area in the ISIL-controlled village of Tall al-Shayir, south of the town of Shaddadah, in the southern part of the governorate, allegedly killing at least 12 civilians, including 3 women and 2 children.
- On 11 July, Ziyanat was hit again with air strikes that reportedly killed at least 10 civilians, including 2 women and 1 child.
- On 12 July, air strikes hit a residential area of the village of Sa'dah, in southern Hasakah, and reportedly killed three civilians — one woman and two children.

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Security Council

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France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Underlining its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

Condemning Al Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing serious concern at the ongoing threat posed by Al Shabaab, and underlining its concern that Al Shabaab continues to hold territory and extort revenue in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of civilian life in Al Shabaab attacks, and paying tribute to the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali Security Forces personnel in the fight against Al Shabaab, and recognizing the need to preserve the gains made through their commitment,

Reiterating its determination to support efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab in Somalia, and *underlining* its commitment to support an inclusive Somali-led political peace and reconciliation process,

Condemning the continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia in particular the deliberate targeting of civilians,

Welcoming the positive contributions that the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) has made to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and *underscoring* the importance of an effective partnership between the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and Member States in Somalia,

Recognizing that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has the primary responsibility to protect its citizens and build its own national security forces, *noting* that these forces should be inclusive and representative of Somalia and act in full compliance with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law,

Commending the decision by the FGS to make security sector reform a priority for the next four years, *welcoming* the FGS and Federal Member State leaders' endorsement of a new National Security Architecture, *calling on* the FGS and the

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Federal Member States to meet the benchmarks set out in the National Security Architecture in view of the remaining threat posed by Al Shabaab, and *underlining* the importance of implementing key decisions that further define the composition and roles of Somalia's national and federal state level security forces in line with the agreed Architecture, in order to accelerate security sector reform,

Reaffirming the strong commitment of international partners to support the FGS and Federal Member States in establishing under the National Security Council and Regional Security Councils, a capable, accountable, acceptable and affordable Somali-led security sector as set out in the Security Pact adopted by Somalia and international partners on 11 May 2017 at the London Somalia Conference,

Recognizing that a more stable Somalia is of vital importance to ensuring regional security,

AMISOM

Commending the contribution of AMISOM to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, noting its critical role in improving the security situation and in providing the security to enable peacebuilding and state-building progress in Somalia, including two national political processes, *expressing* its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops, police and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and *recognizing* the significant sacrifices made by AMISOM forces,

Recalling the Conclusions on Children and Armed Conflict (S/AC.51/2017/2),

Taking note of the Joint AU-UN Review of AMISOM, as requested in paragraph 24 of resolution 2297 (2016), the Report on the Ten Year Lessons Learned from AMISOM 2007-2017, and the African Union Peace and Security Council's communiqué of 12 July 2017 on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, and the outcome of the meeting of Troop and Police Contributing Countries on 3 July 2017,

Expressing its support for a transfer of security tasks from AMISOM to the Somali security forces in a gradual and conditions-based manner, to ensure that the hard won security gains are preserved,

Welcoming the AU's investigation of allegations of sexual violence against some AMISOM troops, *underlining* the importance of the AU implementing the recommendations of the report, taking action to prevent further abuses, and in line with resolution 2272 (2016),

Expressing concern over reports of pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) elements in Somalia and the security implications of the situation in Yemen for Somalia,

Expressing grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian consequences of the severe drought in Somalia, and *commending* AMISOM's facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in support of the Somali authorities,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

AMISOM

1. *Emphasizes* that the long term objective for Somalia, with the support of its international partners, is that Somali Security Forces assume full responsibility for Somalia's security, and in this regard recognizes that AMISOM remains critical

to security during this transition to allow for the Somali Security Forces to build their capacities;

2. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia are not appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep the benchmarks for deployment under continuous review;

3. *Underlines* that the increases in the force strength decided in resolutions 2036 (2012) and 2124 (2013) were to provide short term enhancement to AMISOM's military capacity, and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM's force strength will be considered in light of progress on the ground;

4. *Welcomes* in this regard the recommendation of the AU-UN Review for a gradual and phased reduction and reorganization of AMISOM's uniformed personnel in order to provide a greater support role to the Somali Security Forces as they progressively take the lead for security in Somalia, *welcomes* the FGS's commitment to conduct joint operations in order to become the primary security provider in Somalia, and *underscores* the need for transition of security responsibility to take into consideration security situation in each location;

Priorities and tasks

5. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2018, and to reduce the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel to a maximum level of 21,626 by 31 December 2017, to include a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five Formed Police Units, with a further reduction of uniformed personnel to 20,626 by 30 October 2018, unless the Security Council decides to accelerate the pace of the reduction, taking into account the capabilities of the Somali security forces thus far;

6. *Further decides* that AMISOM shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate;

7. *Decides* to authorize AMISOM to pursue the following strategic objectives:

(a) Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia;

(b) Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

(c) Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia;

8. *Decides* to authorize AMISOM to carry out the following priority tasks to achieve these objectives:

(a) Maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritizing the main population centres;

(b) To assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peacebuilding, and security for key infrastructure;

(c) To protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;

(d) To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;

(e) To conduct targeted offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces;

(f) To mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture;

(g) To reconfigure AMISOM, as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration through the Secretary-General;

(h) To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia;

9. *Requests* the AU to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate, and report to the Council, through the provision of oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, every 120 days with the first written report not later than 15 December 2017;

10. *Requests* that the AU continues to ensure that AMISOM is configured to conduct the full range of mandated tasks effectively, including strengthening command and control structures, under the authority of the Force Commander, capable of operating jointly with Somali security forces;

11. *Welcomes* in this regard the intention of the AU to develop a new Concept of Operations for AMISOM, and *requests* the AU to develop this concept in close collaboration with the United Nations and Federal Government of Somalia;

12. *Recalls* its request that the AU generate the specialized units set out in the annex of resolution 2297 (2016), in particular the Mission Enabling Units, and reiterating the importance that all force enablers and multipliers operate under the command of the Force Commander, further requests that these are generated without delay, and *requests* that the AU provide regular updates on this force generation in its regular reports through the Secretary-General;

13. *Stresses* the critical need to source fully functioning and mission appropriate contingent-owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) either from existing AMISOM troop-contributing countries or other Member States, and *welcomes* the deployment of three helicopters by the Government of Kenya, and *urges* the AU to urgently generate of the remainder of the force enablers;

14. *Stresses* that AMISOM's civilian component should be fully operational to support AMISOM's military and police tasks and improve coordination between the United Nations and the AU in Somalia, with particular emphasis on enhancing the staffing of its human rights component, with a view to increasing capacity to monitor and strengthen respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law and address cases of violations and abuses, in particular allegations of violations and abuses against children;

15. *Further stresses* that AMISOM's civilian component should focus its efforts on supporting the revised tasks of the AMISOM military and police components in order to facilitate the transition and eventual drawdown;

16. *Underlines* the importance of AMISOM forces carrying out their mandate in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including on the basis of specific recommendations made during the Joint Review, and cooperating with UNSOM and UNSOS in implementing the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP), and *calls upon* the AU to investigate and report allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, as well as continuing to ensure the highest standards of transparency, and conduct and discipline;

17. *Welcomes* the progress made by AMISOM in complying with human rights and international humanitarian law, and *urges* troop- and police-contributing countries to accelerate efforts to enhance the effectiveness of measures and mechanisms to prevent and address non-compliance, including on the basis of specific recommendations of the Joint Review, including selection and screening of AMISOM personnel;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces is provided in strict compliance with the HRDDP and to include progress made in implementing the policy in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council, including through the mitigating measures and mechanisms as set out by the Joint Review;

19. *Welcomes* the work of the Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013), and the progress on the "*Ceebla*" hotline, *underlines* the importance of making the CCTARC fully operational and effective without further delay, and in this regard *urges* the full support of troop and police contributors for the CCTARC, in collaboration with humanitarian, human rights and protection actors, and *underlines* the importance of ensuring information is shared with relevant actors including the United Nations and integrated into AMISOM reporting;

20. *Calls on* the AU and troop-contributing countries to take appropriate steps to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, hold perpetrators accountable and repatriate units when there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation or abuse by those units;

21. *Welcomes and strongly encourages* the deployment of female uniformed personnel in AMISOM by the Troop and Police Contributing Countries;

22. *Requests* the FGS to expedite an Operational Readiness Assessment of the Somali security forces, to be completed by 1 December 2017, to be led by the Federal Government of Somalia with the active participation of the Federal Member States, and together with AMISOM and the United Nations and other international partners to determine numbers, capacities, locations and compliance with human rights obligations and international standards including screening for child soldiers, existence of accountability mechanisms, and level of vetting and training, and including the Somali police as well as other Somali security capacities, in order to hand over specific security tasks, identify capacities for joint operations, determine infrastructure, logistical capacity, equipment and training gaps, and provide a baseline for further security sector reform efforts, and to inform a revised Concept of Operations for AMISOM;

23. *Requests* the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive assessment of AMISOM by 15 April 2018, working closely with the African Union and the

Federal Government of Somalia, to take stock of the transition thus far including the development of Somali security institutions, and to make recommendations on the progressive transition from AMISOM to Somali security responsibility including over the electoral period, taking into account the capacities of the Somali security forces;

24. *Expresses* its intention to consider further uniformed personnel reductions as security conditions and Somali capabilities allow, including taking account the recommendations for further reductions made by the assessment requested in paragraph 23;

Support and partnership

25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in supporting the implementation of this resolution, *encourages* continued close collaboration between UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum, in order to enhance coordination efforts on the ground, *further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the AU on the planning, deployment and strategic management of AMISOM in line with the mandate of the United Nations office to the AU, and *reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General, in view of the need to increase AMISOM's efficiency, to enhance the provision of technical advice to the AU through existing United Nations mechanisms;

26. *Stresses* the importance of early and sustained coordination of all joint operations, as well as of follow up activity in newly recovered areas, and *encourages* the strengthening of joint planning and operational management mechanisms in order to prioritize available resources;

27. *Further stresses* the importance of effective joint planning and implementation of the transition of primary security responsibility to the Somali security forces between the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States, the United Nations, African Union and donors, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report on progress towards transition in his reports on the situation in Somalia to the Security Council;

28. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that oversight and accountability, in particular compliance with HRDDP in the context of United Nations support to the transition of responsibilities between AMISOM and Somali Security Forces will be the cornerstone of the partnership between the United Nations, the AU, the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States;

29. *Urges* the full implementation of the Force Commander's directive, in particular on the protection of children's rights during and after operations and to comply with the standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups in Somalia signed by the Federal Government of Somalia;

30. *Welcomes* the support of the international community for peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, as well as support from other bilateral partners for both AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA), *emphasizes* the importance of new contributions, including from new and existing donors from the international community, the African Union Peace Fund, the private sector, civil society and other donations, in order to share the financial burden of supporting AMISOM;

31. *Reiterates* its call for new and existing donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, and technical assistance for AMISOM, and contributions to the United Nations Trust

Fund for AMISOM including contributions destined for the SNA, *calls upon* the AU to consider how to provide sustainable funding for AMISOM, and *underlines* the AU's call for its Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM;

32. *Stresses* the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and under the Security Council's authority consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, *urges* the Secretary-General, African Union and partners to explore in earnest funding arrangements for AMISOM, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations, African Union, the European Union, and to other partners, and considering the limitations of voluntary funding, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for AMISOM, and looks forward to the Secretary-General's report on the future funding of AMISOM by November 2017;

Somali Security Forces

33. *Recognizes* that the primary responsibility for security lies with the Somali people and institutions, and in this regard, *welcomes* the historical political agreement on the National Security Architecture by the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States on 17 April 2017, *commends* their renewed commitment to security sector reform, and *underscores* the need to implement these commitments urgently, and to accelerate reform;

34. *Underlines* the importance of swift implementation of the National Security Architecture, delineating roles and responsibilities of Somalia's security institutions, agreeing on governance and oversight structures and identifying capability gaps in order to guide AMISOM and donors' security sector assistance priorities and signalling areas of cooperation with the international community in order to develop Somali-led security institutions and forces, both military and civilian, that are capable, affordable, acceptable, and accountable, and *emphasizes* the vital importance of the rule of law and of security forces complying with obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law as applicable in particular with respect to ending and preventing recruitment and use of children in armed conflict;

35. *Stresses* the importance of the FGS and Federal Member States accelerating the strengthening and improved coordination of the Somali security institutions, and enhancing efforts to move towards the eventual handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security services and withdrawal of AMISOM;

36. *Welcomes* the commitment of international partners to provide additional and more effective support through the implementation mechanisms agreed at the London Somalia Conference, including more coordinated delivery of mentoring, training, equipment, capacity-building, and remuneration of police and military forces consistent with the Security Pact agreed at the London Somalia Conference, and in this regard *emphasizes* the important role of UNSOM to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support for security sector assistance;

37. *Welcomes* the support already provided by the international community and bilateral donors to the Somali security sector, *encourages* partners to further enhance their support to national and state-level institutions for the development of the Somali security sector, including logistical support, and *calls upon* new partners to come forward to support this development, and reiterates the importance of coordination amongst all partners as agreed in the Security Pact;

38. *Underscores* the need for international partners to closely align their efforts in a fully coordinated manner to enable Somalia to achieve a comprehensive approach to advance sustainable security, and the need to implement commitments through the implementation mechanism set out in the Security Pact on 11 May 2017;

39. *Underlines* that it is essential that military operations are followed immediately by Somali efforts to establish or improve governance structures in recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security, through the National Security Council and Regional Security Councils;

40. *Recognizes* that the threat of Al Shabaab will not be defeated by military means alone, and in this regard *encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of UNSOM, to continue to take a comprehensive approach to security, in line with the Security Pact and the New Partnership Agreement for Somalia, and to implement Somalia's National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia's capacity to prevent and counter-terrorism;

41. *Welcomes* the commitment of the FGS and Federal Member states to establish basic policing services across Somalia, as envisaged in the new federal policing model, *requests* UNSOM to support implementation of the federal policing model, especially at the Federal Member State level, *encourages* donors to support relevant national and state-level institutions in its implementation, *welcomes* capacity-building for the maritime police force in line with resolution 2246 (2015) by the FGS with the support of UNSOM, and *looks forward* to progress towards its implementation;

42. *Commends* the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States for their commitment to increase the transparency and accountability of security sector financial management, and the payment of salaries and support requirements as set out in the Security Pact, and in line with the national constitution and resource sharing mechanisms and looks forward to progress on this commitment;

43. *Calls on* the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States, AMISOM and UNSOM to work to ensure that women and girls are protected from sexual violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse, which can significantly exacerbate and prolong situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, and that victims are supported and perpetrators held accountable, *urges* the Federal Government of Somalia, with the support of the United Nations, to accelerate the implementation of the Joint Communiqué and the National Action Plan to combat sexual violence in conflict;

Logistical support

44. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM and 70 AMISOM civilians, the 10,900 SNA on joint operations with AMISOM, and UNSOM as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2245 (2015), and *requests* the Secretary-General to expedite the necessary procedures to implement resolution 2245 (2015);

45. *Stresses* the need for responsive and effective field support and in this regard *welcomes* UNSOS's efforts, in collaboration with AMISOM, to implement measures aimed at strengthening accountability and efficiency in the management of resources and finances in order to better align the delivery of logistical support to AMISOM's priorities and activities and requests the Secretary-General to report on progress in his regular reporting;

46. *Welcomes* the signing of a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the Governments of Ethiopia and Uganda, with the United Nations, and the African Union, and *urges* all troop- and police-contributing countries to conclude negotiations on the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) without delay;

Somalia

47. *Welcomes* the FGS' active engagement with the Universal Periodic Review Process and encourages implementation of all accepted recommendations;

48. *Expresses* concern at continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and *underscores* the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those responsible for such violations and abuses, *welcomes* the passage of legislation to establish Somalia's National Human Rights Commission, *encourages* the FGS to finalize its status and *further encourages* the FGS to pass legislation aimed at protecting human rights and ensuring investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses;

49. *Expresses* concern at forced evictions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from public and private infrastructure in major towns in Somalia, *stresses* that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, *calls upon* the FGS and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement, and *encourages* the FGS, with the support of partners, to create an environment conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return, local integration or resettlement of IDPs;

50. *Expresses* grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis and risk of famine in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, commends the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors to deliver life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* the increase in attacks against humanitarian workers and *calls on* all parties to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, facilities and assets; *further condemns* any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate rapid, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia; *underlines* the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and *encourages* national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger leadership role in coordination of humanitarian response;

51. *Underlines* the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions, by all actors in Somalia;

52. *Reaffirms* the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, *stresses* the importance of their meaningful participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security;

53. *Strongly condemns* all violations and abuses committed against children in armed conflict in Somalia, *calling on* the Federal Government of Somalia to implement fully the Convention of the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Action Plans signed in 2012, and *underscores* the need to strengthen the legal and operational framework for the protection of children, including by ratification of or accession to its Operational Protocols and strengthen existing vetting mechanisms;

Reporting

54. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution in his regular reports, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 12 January 2018, and every 120 days thereafter;

55. *Requests* the Secretary-General to update the Security Council on the status of the Somali security forces and their readiness to perform security tasks taking into consideration the outcome of the Operational Readiness Assessment, and on the impact of operations on the level of threat from Al Shabaab, and *further requests* the African Union to report through the Secretary-General on progress on the reconfiguration of AMISOM including the deployment of police personnel, and progress towards achieving AMISOM's objectives, in its regular reports to the Security Council in order to maintain the momentum of transition to Somali security forces;

56. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations A/71/1032–S/2017/735

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 25 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour herewith to transmit the present letter with regard to the U.S.-south Korea Ulji Freedom Guardian 17 joint military exercise that have been forced by the U.S. from the date of 21 August 2017, disregarding repeated concerns and oppositions from the international communities.

The U.S. by no means could never camouflage its aggressive true nature of the military drill, though they widely announcing of the joint military exercise as of "annual" and "defensive" manoeuvres.

It is well to know about how intensively the nature of the joint military exercise is provocative and aggressive, if we ascertain only a fact of the purpose of this military drill is concentrated on the target of "decapitation operation" and "secret operation" to remove the supreme headquarters of the DPRK under "Operation Plan 5015".

It is nothing but only the hysteric reckless undertaking just like to add fuel to open fire that the U.S. is staging such kind of provocative and aggressive joint military exercise at this critical moment of the Korean peninsula where the situation is just like a time bomb that nobody sure when to blow up.

All the situation prove vividly that the danger of nuclear war is approaching from the U.S. which remains doggedly unchanged in its sordid intention to conquer the DPRK by force and the U.S. is only the ringleader for destruction of the peace.

Acknowledging that the joint military exercise staged by the U.S. in collaboration with south Korea constitutes grave threats not only to the Korean peninsula but also to the international peace and security, the DPRK strongly requests the Security Council of the United Nations to place the issue of the joint military exercise as its emergency agenda and discuss in the meeting with no further delay.

Should the Security Council, assuming its primary mission for the maintenance of international peace and security, ignores again the DPRK's justified requests,

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then it would only come to make a public disclosure of the Security Council by itself that generated only into the marionette and political tools of the U.S.

Once the U.S. flagrantly revealed its hostile intention against the DPRK by responding with the aggressive joint military exercise, despite warnings from DPRK of watching over a little bit longer the behaviour of the U.S., it is the fair and square self-defensive right of the DPRK to cope with reckless aggressive war manoeuvres and the U.S. would be wholly responsible for any catastrophic consequences to be entailed from the result.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/736

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 August 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 9 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Jonathan Guy Allen has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-14805 (E) 280817

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United Nations S/2017/737

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 August 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Ukraine on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 24 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations stating that Ms. Veronika Taradai has been appointed alternate representative of Ukraine on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-14814 (E) 280817

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United Nations S/2017/738

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 September 2017
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 25 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 22-25 August 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

17-15247 (E) 050917 060917

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Annex to the letter dated 25 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (22 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported one violation in Idlib governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations.

Three United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out: a total of 63 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) were delivered to Tall al-Dhahab in Dar'a governorate; a total of 28 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products and medicine) were delivered to Tayyibah in Dar'a governorate; and the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,207.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (23 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire in Aleppo governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following governorates: two in Homs, one in Damascus and one in Hama.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation, delivering 2.1 tons of food parcels and medicine to the local population of Hama and Suran in Hama governorate.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,207.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (24 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations in the following governorates: two in Hama, one in Damascus and one in Homs.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation, delivering 1.9 tons of food parcels to the local population in Aran, Aleppo governorate.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, four ceasefire agreements have been signed with populated areas: two in Hama governorate and two in Homs governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,211.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (25 August 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Aleppo, one in Damascus and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations in the following governorates: two in Hama, two in Homs and one in Damascus.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: one ton of medicine and school supplies was delivered to the State Centre for Thalassaemia and Genetic Blood Disorders in Aleppo city; and 1.6 tons of food was delivered to the local population in Qusayr, Homs governorate.

Two United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out: a total of 84 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products and medicine) were delivered to Tayyibah in Dar'a governorate; and the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 2,211.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 229.

United Nations S/2017/739

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 August 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 28 August 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I write to convey my serious concern over the irresponsible and unlawful policy persistently taken by the United States of America in the implementation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in defiance of its obligations therein and in arrogant disregard of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the Plan of Action by consensus and called for its implementation.

In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council underlined, among others, that "the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran". The Council correspondingly called upon "all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and the present resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA".

It is manifestly agreed that the Plan of Action "includes the reciprocal commitments" that shall be implemented by all its participants "in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect". It also instructs all participants to "refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation", including regarding the "comprehensive lifting of all United Nations Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme".

The Islamic Republic of Iran has genuinely fulfilled its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as testified time and again by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the past two years. However, one certain member of the Plan of Action, the United States, has persistently refrained from good-faith implementation of its obligations to the extent that not only is the whole agreement put in jeopardy, but also resolution 2231 (2015) is either violated or visibly exposed to future violation.

The United States, particularly under the current administration, has embarked on a malicious policy to prevent Iran from benefiting from the Plan of Action. The United States senior officials are systematically engaged in a "policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic

relations with Iran" by making public statements against the Plan of Action and by adopting certain policies, such as the so-called "policy review", despite the clear commitment under the Plan of Action to act otherwise. The United States policy both contravenes the provisions of the Plan of Action and disrespects the established principles of international law, in particular those enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in the Plan of Action.

As recently as 2 August 2017, the President of the United States signed into law a new Act introducing a series of sanctions against Iran, in total disregard of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Plan of Action. The Act violates the terms of annex B to the resolution as follows:

(a) The Act unilaterally imposes blanket sanctions with extraterritorial effects on the entire Iranian ballistic missile programme for an unspecified period of time. This contradicts paragraph 3 of annex B, in which Iran is called upon "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" for a maximum period of eight years after the day of adoption of the Plan of Action;

(i) There is no doubt that paragraph 3 of annex B deals only with "ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons", but the Act, in complete disregard of the explicit provision of the resolution, sanctions all activities relating to Iran's ballistic missiles without any distinction as to their design or capabilities;

(ii) Any possible constraint on Iranian ballistic missiles under paragraph 3 is for a maximum period of only eight years. It can be even shorter if the "Broader Conclusion" is reached earlier. The Act violates the temporal elements of the paragraph by imposing extraterritorial sanctions against the Iranian ballistic programme for an unspecified period of time;

(b) The Act similarly violates paragraph 5 of annex B by clamping down on any possible case-by-case approval by the Security Council of the sale of conventional weapons to Iran and by disregarding its temporal limitation. The relevant provisions of the Act have even scornfully mocked resolution 2231 (2015) by using almost the exact wording of paragraph 5 of annex B thereto, only to twist its meaning;

(i) Paragraph 5 establishes an authorization regime on certain weapons and military equipment. The Act, however, imposes a comprehensive sanctions regime and actually makes it impossible to seek and acquire any approval from the Security Council. This is another indication that the true objective of the United States is to weaken the defence capacity of Iran;

(ii) The Act totally ignores the five-year duration, specified in paragraph 5, by deliberately sanctioning all the acts mentioned therein;

(c) The Act violates paragraph 4 of annex B as well. IAEA positively verified the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Correspondingly, the Security Council, in paragraph 4 of annex B to its resolution 2231 (2015), recognized this fact by installing a case-by-case approval mechanism for Iran's access to a wide range of items, goods, services and technologies that could contribute "to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems". The Act's extraterritorial sanctioning of all activities relating to Iran's ballistic missile programme is in blatant defiance of the said paragraph;

(d) The extraterritorial nature of the sanctions stipulated in the Act further undermines the constructive atmosphere created after the lifting of the Security Council sanctions. Certain provisions therein also undo the effect of the current

sanction-lifting, while at the same time, by making arbitrary timings and schedules, they render the termination of the remaining restrictions, to become effective on the transition day of the Plan of Action, as envisaged in resolution 2231 (2015) and the Plan of Action, moot and irrelevant.

I, therefore, urge you to use your powers under the Charter and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including by reporting to the Council, to ensure that the United States ceases this unlawful policy and fulfils its obligations under the Plan of Action.

The Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its right to take necessary measures in order to safeguard its vital national interests.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative